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Lugar: Water Law in West Virginia

Water Law in West Virginla*
MARLYN E. LuGAR**

The time allowed for this part of the program will not permit an
examination of all phases of the West Virginia law applicable to the
water resources of the state. Therefore, it has been necessary to
choose segments which may be of special interest as related to the
beneficial use of this resource, especially as applied to the problems
which arise when the water supply becomes scarce.
This discussion will not deal with the legal rights concerning the
purity of water, even though the quantity of water available for many
uses will be dependent upon its quality. Abundance of water even
though available at the right time and place, and even with the
right to use the quantity needed, will not result in a beneficial use
of the water if it is so polluted that it is not economically feasible
to use the water for a planned purpose. As you have already learned
during this symposium, the West Virginia Legislature has shown
concern as to this problem and active steps are being taken to control or eliminate pollution of the waters in this state. Neither the
statutory law applicable to these efforts nor the common law rights
of riparian owners to protection against pollution of streams will
be discussed at this time.
In addition, in efforts to conserve water or to make it available
for use at a particular location, legal rights as to disposition of water
may become important. Most of the cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in which legal principles concerning our water resources have been established have involved
"too much water" and the damages resulting in the casting of that
water on others. However, the principles in those cases will be
applicable, even when there is an anticipated scarcity of water, if
another is damaged by the mere detention of water which is present
or by the transferring of it to a different location. Time limitations
will not permit a discussion of that body of law.
*This paper was originally delivered at the Symposium on Water Resources Research, November 22, 1963, Conference Center, Mont Chateau State
Park. Only minor changes have been made in the text, including the moving
of the authorities cited therein to the footnotes in this article. Relatively few
authorities were cited in the paper as originally presented and distributed;
suppovting authorities for other statements therein have been added for the
purposes of this publication.
0Professor of Law, College of Law, West Virginia University.
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The present discussion will be limited primarily to the right to use
the water which is available, including an examination of the persons
who have rights to use it and of the quantity which each may legally
use. These are the rights which will be of special interest when the
water supply is scarce. In West Virginia there is no statutory law
applicable to these problems, and the West Virginia case law is
meager on these subjects. Therefore, much of this discussion must
be based on predictions of what the courts will decide in these
areas, basing the predictions, first, on the premises which have been
controlling in the prior West Virginia decisions concerning water
rights, and second, on the law in other jurisdictions which recognize
the same general principles of water rights as heretofore recognized
by the West Virginia court. Decisions from the western states cannot be used as the basis for these predictions since, as we shall see,
those states have a basically different concept of water rights law.
The West Virginia court has been confronted with the normal
classifications into which water has been placed for the purpose of
determining private legal rights to use water. The four broad categories which the courts have normally used in dealing with water
rights are:
1. Watercourses;
2. Surface waters;
3. Percolating waters; and
4. Underground waters in watercourses.
This classification will be followed herein in analyzing the legal
rights to use such waters.
1. WATERCOURSES
The West Virginia court in describing watercourses has frequently
used the following language:

..... 'A water course consists of bed, bank and water. Yet
the water need not continually flow, as many streams are sometimes dry. There is a difference between a water course and
an occasional outburst of water which, at times of freshet,

from rain or snow, descends from the hills and inundates the
country. To be a water course, it must appear that the water
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usually flows in a certain direction, and by a regular channel,
with banks or sides ...

."'I

For the sake of brevity, such a watercourse is often called a stream
and this terminology will be used interchangeably herein.
(a)

Appropriation Doctrine.

In many western states the legal doctrine applied to the use of
water from streams is that of "prior appropriation." It has been
recognized as the sole basis for determining such rights in some of
these states, and has been combined with the riparian doctrine in
others.2 Briefly, the appropriation doctrine was derived from early
mining customs, particularly in California, and bases the right to
the use of water on priority of beneficial use. It is sometimes
referred to as the doctrine of "first come, first served." Since rights
thereunder are not dependent on ownership of land or its location
but rather on beneficial use of water, persons who have acquired
rights may use the appropriated water beyond the watershed of the
stream from which it is derived and they need not be owners of land
abutting on the stream. The rights, however, are for fixed quantities
of water and they may be lost by nonuse.' In appropriation states,
certain uses may have preferences over other uses. For example,4
water for irrigation may have a preference over use for mining.
Also in most of these states permits to appropriate must be obtained
from an administrative agency, and the dates of application for such
permits may be controlling as between the applicants.'
'McCausland v. Jarrell, 136 W. Va. 569, 578, 68 S.E.2d 729, 736
(1951), quoting from the syllabus in Neal v. Ohio River R.R., 47 W. Va.

316, 34 S.E. 914 (1899).

Compare the much briefer definition of a "water-

course" in REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 841 (1939).
Water from rain or melted snow, although running through a natural
depression but with no definite channel, is surface water; but when such
water begins to flow permanently in a well-defined stream with a bed and
banks, it becomes a watercourse. 2 THOUTSo N, REAL PROPrEwr § 650 (penn.
ed. rev. 1939), citing inter alia, Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 56 W. Va. 494, 49
S.E. 378 (1904).
2
VI-A AmmcAN LA-w OF PRoPERTY § 28.58 (Casner ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Scope Note preceding §850 at 340 (1939); C
A
N,
PRNciPLEs OF WATER RsGir LAw 3N Osao 2 (1957); Busby, American
Water Rights Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106 (1952).

14 Authorities cited in note 2 supra.

VI-A AmEcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.58 at 176 (Casner ed. 1954);
Thomas, Appropriations of Water for a Preferred Purpose, 22 Rocwz MT. L.
REv. 422 (1950).
SVI-A AmmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.58 at 174 (Casner ed. 1954).
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Riparian Doctrine.

In the eastern part of the United States, private rights to the use
of water in streams are governed by the common law under the
riparian doctrine. The rights to use stream water are derived from
ownership of the lands through which the stream flows or by which
it is bounded.6 (If the water in a natural watercouse is a lake or
pond, the landowners' rights to the water therein are often called
littoral rather than riparian, but the rights are not different.')
Priority in time with respect to ownership of the land or use of the
water is not important. The doctrine is one of general equality as
to all persons owning land on the stream, regardless of the extent
of the frontage, and the rights are not lost by nonuse.8
The doctrine of riparian rights in streams seems to have been
derived from the civil law rather than from the common law of
England and to have been introduced into American law by Story
and Kent.9 In any event, it is recognized as common law in the
eastern states, including West Virginia.
In Roberts v. Martin,0 the West Virginia court, relying upon the
riparian doctrine, limited the use of stream water to riparian owners,
that is, to those who own land crossed or bounded by the stream.
The defendants in this case had purchased their "right" to use the
water on their non-riparian land from an upper riparian owner. The
court held that a lower riparian owner could prevent the defendants'
use even though only a small quantity of water was being taken from
the stream and the lower owner did not need the water and was not
actually damaged. This law applies also to municipal corporations
by the majority view; that is, even though the city is a riparian owner,
it cannot as such owner claim a right to supply its inhabitants with
water from the stream."
6 Id. at
7 Id. at
8

9

§ 28.55.
158.

Id. at § 28.55.

VI-A AMEacIAN LAw OF PROPERTy § 28.55 at
RE-sTATEMENT, ToRTs, Introductory Note preceding
CALAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.

158 (Casner ed. 1954);

§ 850 at 342 (1939);

'°72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913).
1'By the weight of authority, a municipality, merely as a riparian owner,
has no right to divert the waters of a stream for the purposes of a public water
supply. See the cases collected in Annot., 141 A.L.R. 639 (1942), including
as supporting this view Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921).
See also 3 TimFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 725 (3d ed. 1939). (Of course, a
municipality may take water from a stream for a public purpose under the
power of eminent domain.) This principle does not apply to a municipality's
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This West Virginia case may well pose the problem as to whether
the upper riparian owner could have acquired this tract of land from
the nonriparian owners and then have used water from the stream
thereon. In the majority of the jurisdictions no limitation is placed on
the size of the tract which may be regarded as riparian, assuming
that it is held as one tract and is within the watershed involved.
However, in some states a riparian owner cannot add to his riparian
tract by acquiring a contiguous inland area. 2 Thus, in some states
riparian land may lose its favored position if separated from the
portion abutting on the stream, and it may not become riparian by
later being rejoined to that which abuts on the stream. In any event,
it is generally held that water may not be diverted from the stream
for use on land which is beyond the watershed of the stream. 3
In the Roberts case the West Virginia court made the following
observations as to the nature of the rights of a riparian owner:
"Plaintiff . . . is entitled as a riparian owner to have the
stream which washes his land flow as it is wont by nature without diminution or alteration. He may insist that the stream shall
flow to his land in the usual quantity, in its natural place and
at its natural height, and that it shall flow off the land to his
neighbor below in its accustomed place and at its usual level.
While he has no property in the water itself, yet his right to
the natural flow of the water will be regarded and protected as
property. His right to have the water pass his land in its natural
current is not an easement or appurtenance; but it is a right
annexed to the soil which he owns. The right exists jure
naturae as parcel of the land. Gould on Waters (3rd ed.), sec.
204; Pomeroy on Riparian Rights, secs. 7-9. The flow of the
water in its natural way and at its natural height is a part of
taking surface water or percolating water for its water supply. See CAL.n4anr,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 15, and the discussion in the text, infra, concerning
the use of these types of water. Compare the position taken in RESTATEMNT,
TORTS § 855, comment at 374 and 377 (1939) on the use of a stream for the
water supply of a town or city bordering thereon, as well as on the sale of
water from a stream by a riparian owner to a nonriparian village.
12VI-A AMmucar LAkw OF PROPERTY § 28.55 at 160 (Caser ed. 1954);
3 TiFFANY, REaL PROPERTY § 727 (3d ed. 1939). For a collection of the
pertinent cases, see the addendum to Maloney, The Balance of Convenience
Doctrine in the Southeastern States, Particularly as Applied to Water, 5
S.C.L.Q. 159, 178 (1952). The Restatement takes the position that the parcel
of land, which will be considered "riparian land," means a continuous tract
or plot of land in one possession, no part of which is separated from the rest
by intervening land in another possession. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 843 (1939).
13 CAAiru,
op. cit. supra note 2, at § 21.
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plaintiffs landed estate. Interference with the flow is the

infringement of a property right of plaintiff for which he may
have redress as readily as for violation of his right to any
other portion of the soil." 4
This statement of the law has sometimes been referred to as the
"natural flow" theory. Under it, the stream could not be lawfully
diminished in quantity. 5 If applied literally, the doctrine would
permit no consumptive use at all except diversions which would
be so small as to be considered de minimus, for example, a oneinch pipeline from the Great Kanawha.'"
It will be noted, however, that in this case the court in fact applied
the theory only to nonriparian use of the water."7 There is no indication that the court would not permit consumptive use of the water
In
14 Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 94, 95, 77 S.E. 535, 536 (1913).
Mcausland v. Jarrell, 136 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E.2d 729 (1951), the court
recognized the principles applied in the Roberts case, quoted these statements
and additional ones therefrom, and cited many West Virginia cases in which
the principles as quoted bad been recognized by the West Virginia court
since the decision of the Roberts case.
J The following observations were made by the court in the Roberts
case: "Defendants, by their act in taking the water, . . . are disturbing the
natural flow of the stream to which he is entitled, by reducing the quantity
of water that would naturally flow therein. Their act is an unlawful one.
It does not matter whether plaintiff is actually damaged. Nor does it matter
that plaintiff does not need the water for use." Roberts v. Martin, supra
note 14, at 95, 77 S.E. at 536.
16 This illustration was used by the court in the Roberts case. The court
also noted that another court bad stated that the de minimis maxim is applied
to the condition of the stream at the time of its lowest stage and not at the
average flow. Roberts v. Martin, supra note 14, at 98, 77 S.E. at 538.
Even under the "natural flow" doctrine, it is recognized that water may
be taken from the stream and consumed for domestic needs. VI-A AMERICAN
LAW OF PRoPERTY §§ 28.56, 28.57 (Caser ed. 1954). See the discussion
in the text, infra, concerning the use of water from streams for domestic needs.
Compare the statement of the legal consequences of the "natural flow"

theory in

RESTATEMENT,

ToRTs, Introductory Note preceding § 850 at 342

(1939). The de minimis maxim is recognized in RESTATENMENT, ToRTs §
855(d)
1 7 (1939).
The court made these observations: " . . . The diversion of the water
by the pipe line to nonriparian land is an exrtordinary use to which the
riparian owner who sold to defendants is not entitled by the law relating to
riparian rights . . . .No reasonable use of the water is made in connection
with the riparian land, but the water is taken therefrom and conducted wholly
around the land of the plaintiff, so that he is deprived of his legal right to
its flow in the natural course .. " Roberts v. Martin, supra note 14 at 97,
77 S.E. at 735. This principle is generally recognized as applicable under
the "natural flow" doctrine, namely, that no diversion is permitted to nonriparian lands, nonriparian uses being injurious at law, even if not in fact,
LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.56 (Casner ed.
to riparian interests. VI-A AMEc=
1954). Compare, however, the manner in which riparian and nonriparian
uses
of the water from a watercourse are treated in RlESTATEmENT, TonTs § 855
(1939).
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of the stream as between riparian owners. In fact, the court in this
opinion and in others has recognized, although it has never so held,
that the right of each riparian owner to the natural flow of the
stream is subject to reasonable use of the water by other riparian
owners as the stream runs through or contiguous to their lands."

This doctrine is usually referred to as the "reasonable use" doctrine.
In the Roberts case, the court quotes at length from Kent's Commentaries, pointing out in substance that it would be unreasonable to

debar every riparian proprietor from the application of the water to
domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes, provided the use
of it be made under the limitations of equal rights without material
injury or annoyance to the lower riparian owners.' 9 Two difficulties
with this "reasonable use" doctrine are that no cause of action arises
until a lower riparian owner has been injured and, further, what is
a reasonable use generally cannot be determined without litigation.
The latter of these two problems will be examined first. Assuming that the water is being taken from a "stream '2 0 and assuming
that the land on which it is to be used is riparian, 2 under the reasonable use doctrine are all beneficial uses to be treated in the same
manner? Further, will it make a difference depending upon what uses
the other reparian owners are making of the water? It is usually said
that a riparian owner may take a greater quantity of water for
domestic purposes than for uses of a commercial nature. It has been
18 Recognition of the right of a riparian owner to make a reasonable use
of the water from a stream is apparent from these portions of the opinion:
"Of course the right of a lower riparian owner to the natural flow of the
stream through his land is subject to reasonable uses of the water by upper
riparian owners as it runs through their lands before reaching his. 2 Farnham
on Waters, sec. 464. Each riparian proprietor has a right to a reasonable use
of the waters flowing through or by his land, for the purpose of supplying his
natural wants. Says Chancellor Kent: '... Streams of water are intended for
the use and comfort of man; and it would be unreasonable and contrary to
the universal sense of mankind, to debar every riparian proprietor from the
application of the water to domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes,
provided the use of it be made under the limitations which have been mentioned; ....

All that the law requires of the party, by or over whose lands

a stream passes, is, that he should use the water in a reasonable manner, and
so as not to destroy, or render useless, or materially diminish, or affect, the
application of the water by the proprietors above or below on the stream.' 3
Kent. Com. 439." Roberts v. Martin, supra note 14 at 95-97, 77 S.E. at 536537.
19 Id. at 96, 77 S.E. at 537. For a general discussion of the "reasonable
use" doctrine, see VI-A AMmmcaN LAw oF PRoPERTY § 28.57 (Casner ed.
1954); lEsTATMENT, ToRTs, Introductory Note preceding § 850 at 344
(1939).
20 See the discussion in the text, infra, concerning problem areas in determining whether the water is being taken from a "stream" or "watercourse."
2 See the discussion in the text, supra, concerning what is "riparian land."
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said that the upper riparian owner may take such quantities as he
needs for domestic purposes even though none is left for domestic
or commercial uses of lower owners. 2 Domestic uses might best
be classified as an exception to the general doctrine of correlative
rights in stream water.23 Since there have been no decisions on this
right in West Virginia, the law is uncertain in this jurisdiction.
Further, even if this be the law, what are domestic uses? It has
been said that they are limited to uses which are necessary for the
sustaining of life on the riparian land. For example, drinking,
bathing, irrigating gardens supplying food for family use and the
watering of farm animals are domestic uses, but large-scale irrigation or the watering of a large herd for commercial purposes is not
included.2 4
If the use is commercial, it must first be determined whether the
particular use is itself reasonable without regard to the circumstances
of use; for example, is commercial irrigation a reasonable use?25
Second, even if the commercial use is reasonable in this sense, is the
quantity of water which is being taken reasonable with reference to
similar rights of other riparian owners either for the same commercial purpose or for different commercial uses?26 Even if criteria
are established for testing these matters,2" the test of "reasonable use"
is difficult to apply and perhaps can only be determined from time
to time by the court or jury as conflicting claims are asserted in
actual litigation. Even though the reasonable portion for use is
established by court decree, the order would be subject to modifica22

VI-A AM.RICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.57 (Casner ed. 1954); 3
(3d ed. 1939); 2 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY,
§ 656 (perm. ed. rev. 1939) (statement therein as to municipal domestic use
is minority
view-see note 11, supra).
23
VI-A AMEmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.57 at 165 (Caser ed. 1954);
CALLAHAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at § 12.
24
VIA AmERCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.57 at 165 (Caser ed. 1954).
See also 3 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 724 (3d ed. 1939).
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 724

25

LAw

For a discussion of the problems in irrigation cases, see VI-A AmERuCAN
PROPERTY § 28.57 at 166 (Caser ed. 1954). See also CALLAHAN,

OF

op. cit. supra note 2, at § 15.
26 CAAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 16. Compare the statement of
the legal consequences of the "reasonable use" theory in RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
Introductory
Note preceding § 850 at 344 (1939).
27
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 854 (1939) lists five factors as important in
determining the gravity of intentional harm to a riparian proprietor through
a non-trespassory invasion of his interest in the use of water in a watercourse.
In substance, those factors would be applied in determining whether the use
is "reasonable." See also the discussion as to such criteria in CALAHAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at § 17. Compare 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 724
(3d ed. 1939) which also discusses rights as between opposite riparian owners.
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tion if future changes show that portion to be unreasonable,2 8 and
there are no West Virginia decisions as to either what commercial
uses are reasonable or what determines the reasonableness of any
commercial use in relation to use by other riparian owners for commercial purposes.
The first difficulty with the "reasonable use" doctrine mentioned
above was that no cause of action arises until a lower riparian owner
has been injured.2 9 This has reference to the establishment of rights
by prescription to use water in streams. Basically this is a common law doctrine which permits one to acquire rights as against
others by "continued and uninterrupted, open and visible, use of a
definite right in the land of another which is identical to that claimed
as an easement and has a relation to the use of, and a direct and
apparent connection with, the dominant tenement under an adverse
claim of right, for the prescriptive period of time."3 The period of
time required in West Virginia is ten years or more." Thus, a
riparian owner may lose his rights as to water in a stream as against
others if their use of such water meets the test of this doctrine.
This doctrine of prescription as applied to nonriparian uses
seems more satisfactory than when it is applied to use on riparian
lands. As noted above, the natural flow theory applies to nonriparian uses, and the use becomes adverse as to lower reparian
owners on the stream involved as soon as a perceptible amount of
water is take from the stream, even though the lower riparian owners
are not being injured by the water's being taken. A cause of action
arises for the riparian owners and the prescriptive period begins to
run against them as soon as such nonriparian use is made if the
other conditions as to adverse use are satisfied, even though this
use does not interfere with any use by the riparian owners and no
harm to them results.32 If the riparian owners are not being injured, they may not in fact complain for the prescriptive period, and
28
VI-A AMEIRCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.57 at 170 (Casner ed. 1954);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Introductory Note preceding § 850 at 344 and 346;
CALLAHAN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at § 18.
29
Kinyon, What Can a Riparian Proprietor Do? 21 MnN. L. REv. 512,
525 (1937); CALLAn, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 7. See also the authorities
cited3 in
0 note 33, infra.
Paden City v. Felton, 136 W. Va. 127, 137, 66 S.E.2d 280, 286 (1951).
31 Id. at 139, 66 S.E.2d at 288.
32 As the court said in the Roberts case:
. . . The unlawful act of
defendants will, in time, ripen into an adverse right if permitted to continue.
. .. Roberts v. Martin, supra note 14, at 99, 77 S.E. at 538. See also Town
of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1964

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the nonriparian owner's right to use water from the stream may become established.
The nonriparian owner may not desire to assume the risk of
investment needed for such water use when ten years are required
before the right is fixed, but the riparian owner's risk may be greater
under the "reasonable use" doctrine which is applied to him. It is
true that the riparian owner is in the favored position so far as
some use of the stream water is concerned; he may safely invest if
the only uses which he will ever make of the water of the stream
will continue to be viewed by the courts as reasonable.
If a riparian use is only to be reasonable, the landowner has that
right as soon as he becomes a riparian owner. However, if he wants
assurance that he can legally continue to use the amount of water for
which he makes an investment, even though it may become an
unreasonable amount, he can acquire no rights by prescription to
such amount of water from the stream until this amount becomes
unreasonable. This would not occur until his use causes harm to the
riparian owners involved, or, in other words, until they need water
from the stream. Their rights are not lost by nonuse, and riparian
rights are not related to priority of use. 3 The law, which gives the
riparian owner making the investment the right to continue to use
the stream water until another riparian owner is injured, also
prevents the investor from acquiring any rights against those riparian
owners who may later need water from the stream. It is not until
then that their causes of action arise. The investment must be made
on the assumption that, when other riparian owners need the water,
the investor will have a fair return from the beneficial use which he
has already made and from that which he may continue to make as
his share which is reasonable as to all riparian owners then asserting rights to use the water of the stream.
One other difficulty with placing any reliance on the prescriptive
rights doctrine, whether for riparian or nonriparian uses, is that
112 ThompsoN, REAL PRoPERTY § 654 at 297 (perm. ed. rev. 1939)
states that such rights are "not gained by use or lost by disuse." See also
REsTATEmENT, TORTs, Introductory Note preceding § 850 at 345, which states
that, since a use cannot be said to be unreasonable when it causes no harm
to others, there is no cause of action against one who is making a use, at
least until it causes harm, and further that, even when harm is caused, there
is no liability for making the use unless it is unreasonable in view of all of
the circumstances of the case. Compare 3 TnFF Y, REAL PNoPERTY § 726

(3d ed. 1939), noting, however, that the text there has reference to an "unreasonable" appropriation of water. See also the authorities cited in note 29,
supra.
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such rights do not run upstream as to the right to use the water.3 4
The riparian owners upstream from the point of diversion have no
causes of action against those who are diverting the water below them;
using the water from the stream below a riparian owner does not
interfere with his right to take the water as it passes his land, and
therefore such use cannot be adverse to his rights.
Now consider what bodies of water are classified as "streams"
though not normally so called, including the question as to when
such bodies either become or cease to be "streams." Although it
may not be difficult in most cases to determine that flowing surface water in a channel is a stream or watercourse within the
description quoted above, some consideration needs to be given to
the more frequent problem areas.
(c) Springs.
In Roberts v. Martin,'" the West Virginia court applied the
riparian doctrine to water taken by the defendants from one of
the springs which constituted the source of the stream as to which
the plaintiff was a riparian owner. The defendants were conducting
the water from this spring by a small pipeline to nonriparian land.
Therefore, a spring which is a source of a flowing stream is regarded
as part of the stream, and use of water therefrom is controlled by
the riparian doctrine. Accordingly, a nonriparian has no right to
use the water from the spring, and a riparian owner, including the
one on whose land the spring is located, is permitted to make only a
"reasonable use" thereof along with other riparian owners on the
stream. 6
The law may be different if there is no outlet in the nature of a
watercourse for the water to escape from the spring.'"
(d) Ravines.
From the description of watercourses, as shown above, it is
apparent that water need not flow continually in the channel for the
34 Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the
Use of Water, 23 TExAs L. REv. 24, 48 (1954). See also Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921); VI-A A.mcAN LAw OF
PROPERTY § 28.56 (Casner ed. 1954); 2 T-orsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 666
(penn. ed. rev. 1939).
3"72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 537 (1913).
36 3 TiFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 739 (3d ed. 1939); 1 and 2 THmoMsoN,
REAL PROPERTY §§ 77 and 651 (perm. ed. rev. 1939). RESTATENMNT, TORTS
§ 841 (1939), in defining the term "watercourse," includes springs in which a
stream7 originates or through which it flows.
3
See the authorities cited in note 36, supra.
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water which does flow therein to be treated as a stream. Most
courts hold, however, that a flow of water through a swale or
ravine, which takes place whenever it rains and then ceases until
the next rain, is not a watercourse since it lacks any element of
permanency.38 However, there need not be a constant source of
supply, seasonal flow therein being sufficient as long as such water
rises from a fixed and predictable source.39 These considerations
naturally pose the problem of whether surface waters may become a
stream, or vice versa, and thereafter be governed by a different body
of law.
Several times the West Virginia court has been confronted by
these problems as related to the disposition of water. In Neal v.
Ohio River R.R.,40 the defendant made an inadequate opening
through a fill which it had placed across a channel through which
water ran from a pond on the plaintiffs' land. The plaintiffs claimed
the channel was a watercourse; the defendant contended that it was
only surface water which had been stopped by the inadequate
opening. Since the facts involved offer a rather common picture, the
court's detailed analysis merits attention. These are the facts and
the court's reasoning:
"....

we must see whether the water obstructed in this case

was only surface water or a water course. On this land, in a
basin or depression, there had always been a pond, covering
half an acre in natural state, used for watering stock, fed by
water from rain and snow gathered over a considerable area,
conducted from hills back of it by several ravines,-so to call
them. This pond always had water in it. It had an outlet to the
Ohio river by means of a channel cut by the water, through
which, when too full, it discharged itself, twenty or twenty-five
feet wide, where it ran under a trestle of the railroad before the
fill was made where the trestle had stood. The channel was not
deep under the trestle, having a wide space to spread out; but
thirty yards from the trestle it narrowed, and the ravine or
channel was very deep. This stream had been running under
the trestle ten years, and had always been there. Great quantities
3 3 TIFFANY, RE.AL PROPERTY § 719 (3d ed. 1939). See also the concept
of reasonable permanency in the definition of a "lake," as that term is included
within9 the term "watercourse" in RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 842 (1939).
VI-A AMERCAN LAW OF PRoPERTY §§ 28.55 and 28.61 (Casner ed.
1954); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 719 (3d ed. 1939); 2 THOlmrPSoN, REAL

PROPERTY
4047

§ 650 (perm. ed. rev. 1939).

W. Va. 316, 34 S.E. 914 (1899).
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of water came down from the hills through this pond; sometimes, in heavy rains, bringing down great stones and other
debris. Before the fill was made, this water freely flowed into
the river. The water in this pond covered, in natural state,
half an acre, for the depth of three feet; and any rise would go
off by the said outlet to the river. It was never dry, and, when
rains or snow came, it received and discharged much water.
I do not regard the four ravines or drains going into the pond as
water courses. But how as to the pond and its outlet? . . . I
regard the outlet from this pond as complying with this definition. There was a quantity of water regularly passing, considerable except in droughts, in one, and only one, direction;
not squandering and wandering over the surface as surface
water does, but in a defined channel, over a bed, between banks,
-through a channel cut by the waters long ago .... I do not
see why this stream does not fill this measure. Here was the
pond, a material element, made up by various incoming drains.
Gould, Waters, §263, says that 'mere surface water may be
said to form a water course at the point where it begins to have
a reasonably well defined channel, with bed and banks or sides,
though the stream itself be very small, and the water may not
flow continuously, and surface water ceases to be such after
entering within the banks of a water course.' See 24 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law, 904. It seems to me that this large quantity of water
collected in this pond, and going from it as constantly as water
came in the usual course of nature, by a fixed channel, over a
fixed bed, is not mere surface water. It originated in rains. So
do all streams. But when it reached this pond it lost the
character of surface water .... ,41
In McCausland v. Jarrell,42 the defendants raised the elevation of
farm land in the path of water which flowed from the plaintiff's
land to and through the defendants' land. Before the defendants
made the change, the water had formed a swamp or small pond on
the defendants' land and drained therefrom into a stream. The
plaintiff contended that the water which was blocked was a watercourse, and the majority of the appellate court agreed; but one of
the dissenting judges and the lower court took the position that the
water was only surface water. The majority opinion points out that
41
42

Id. at 319, 34 S.E. at 915.
136 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E.2d 729 (1951).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1964

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

before the change was made there was a well-defined bed and banks,
normally containing water that usually flowed in a known direction
and in a regular channel, and that it was created by nature and not by
human work or effort. It was also observed that a watercourse implies a place of discharge, ordinarily emptying into a river or another
watercourse, but that even if a stream spreads out on land and there
terminates, that does not deprive that part of the stream which flows
regularly through a channel of its character as a watercourse.4 3 This
may imply that water in a stream may become surface water and
that here the water after it reached the defendants' land may have
become such. However, it has been held in other jurisdictions that
a watercourse does not become surface water at some particular
place though it there spreads out over a wide space without apparent
banks if it subsequently again passes into a regular channel."
(e)

Ponds and Lakes.

In both the Neal and McCausland cases, the court was confronted with the treatment of water in ponds. This appears more
indirectly in the latter case, but Judge Lovins' dissent therein was
based on the water involved being "a series of surface ponds." To
what lakes and ponds does the riparian doctrine apply? For the
purpose of classification as used in this paper, when may they be
regarded as watercourses or streams?
As between several persons owning land abutting on any lake or
pond, they are treated the same as riparian proprietors on a watercourse.4" If water passes from a pond or lake by a natural watercourse, the owners of land abutting on the pond or lake are treated
also as riparian owners as to others owning land abutting on the
watercourse, and the latter in turn owe reciprocal riparian duties to
the owners of land abutting on the lake or pond. 6 In the case of a
lake or pond, however, the water of which, so far as appears, does
not pass out in a watercourse, the water apparently is regarded as
belonging to the one who is the exclusive owner of the land on which
the pond is located.47 It should be noted that this apparently does not
43

Id.at 579, 68 S.E.2d at 736.

44 3 Tmn
Fa Y,REAL PRoPERTY
REAL PRoPERTY § 651 (perm. ed.

§ 740 at 156 (3d ed. 1939); 2 THOmrPsON,
rev. 1939); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 841 at

323 (1939).
41 VI-A AsNscAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 at 158 (Casner ed. 1954);
3 TwFAY, REAL PROPERTY § 739 at 151 (3d ed. 1939).
4'3
TiFFARY, REAL PROPERTY § 739 at 151 (3d ed. 1939).
47
ld. at 154. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 841, 842 (1939).
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include those cases in which two or more own land abutting on such
lake or pond, where they are each treated as riparian owners, as
noted above.
It seems that the West Virginia court could have applied these
principles in deciding the Neal and McCausland cases. In both cases
it seems that the ponds had natural watercourse outlets and thus
might have been treated as "watercourses" and the riparian doctrine
applied.
(f) Artificial Watercourses.
In the McCausland case, Judge Haymond in writing the opinion
made reference to the fact that the bed and banks were "created
by nature and not by human work or effort." If this were not
true, could the stream have been treated as a natural watercourse?
The same problem may also arise as to artificial lakes, ponds, and
reservoirs." Will the riparian doctrine apply to them after their
artifical creation? This may become of special importance with the
increased use of detention dams for both water conservation and
flood control. The problem may also arise from the diversion of
natural watercourses for manufacturing, irrigation, or even domestic
use. We are not here concerned primarily with those who may lose
water by the diversion and who may have a right to prevent the
diversion; we are now dealing with those who own land on the body
of water which has been artifically created or diverted.
The law to be applied in such situations is certainly not settled.
The decisions which have been rendered by the courts are not
consistent. Traditionally riparian rights attach to natural watercourses, but this does not mean that such rights or similar ones may
not attach to bodies of water existing in particular locations by virtue
of human work or effort. Sometimes courts apply the doctrine of
reciprocal easements by prescription; sometimes the estoppel theory,
especially if the change appears to be permanent.49 The cases have
been collected in a leading article by Dean Evans. He made these
observations:
"Perhaps almost enough has been said respecting riparian
rights, the theory here advocated being that when a stream
48 3 TnWFANY, REA. PRoPERTY § 739 at 155 (3d ed. 1939).
§§ 720, 737 (3d ed. 1939). See also VI-A
§ 28.55 at 157 n. 8 (Casner ed. 1954); 2

493 TIFFANY, RFAL PROPERTY

AMERIcAN LAW
THoMwsoN,

OF PROPERTY

§§ 650, 668
§ 841 at 321 (1939).

REAL P.RoPERTY

sTATEmENT, TORTS

(penn. ed. rev. 1939); and RE-
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diversion has occurred or an artificial lake, reservoir or other
body of water has been created and has continued long enough
to assume in the minds of those in the neighborhood a settled
condition, (sometimes called an appearance of permanency)
the artificial condition is now to be regarded the same as if it
had been caused by nature rather than by the hand of man.
When this has occurred, riparian rights should attach. The
question should not be simply with what intent was the diversion made, but rather what do general appearances lead people
who may be affected thereby to believe.
"An important element should be lapse of time. There
should be a strong presumption that a long continued situation has become permanent even though it may be that the
act of alteration may not originally have been intended to make
a permanent change. The period of limitations as such should
not be conclusive inasmuch as a settled condition may well
appear in much shorter time, but a longer period might be
necessary where the circumstances were otherwise inconclusive.
"In cases from many states artifical diversions of streams
and artificial lakes and reservoirs have been held to afford the
owners riparian rights in the lands so affected....
"In many cases riparian rights are not mentioned, but their
existence is inferable from the conclusions reached. ... ."o
Judge Haymond's reference in the McCausland case to channels
created "not by human work or effort" seems to have stemmed from
the majority opinion which he had written earlier that year in
Paden City v. Felton.5 In this latter case two judges dissented.
The defendant had obstructed a drainage ditch which ran through
her lot by placing debris therein. The ditch was two to four feet
deep and four to six feet wide as it passed through the defendant's
lot. The municipal corporation sought to enjoin the interference
with the flow of water through the ditch from which it emptied into
a watercourse. In the majority opinion this statement appears:
...

the ditch is obviously a man made, artifical watercourse, and...

50 Evans, Riparian Rights in Artifical Lakes and Streams, 16 Mo. L. Rxv.
93, 113 (1951) (reprinted with permission from the University of Missouri
School of Law).

51 136 W. Va. 127, 66 S.E.2d 280 (1951).
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a natural watercourse, unlike the present ditch, is a watercourse which
consists of bed, bank, and water, and in which the water usually
flows in a certain direction and by a regular channel with banks and
sides." 2 Judge Given, writing for the dissenting judges, summarized
their position in this manner:
"As I understand, the majority concedes that if the ditch is a
natural water course, within the legal meaning of that term, or
partakes of the nature thereof, the defendant would have no
right to obstruct the flow of water through the same. The
majority opinion simply dismisses the question of whether the
so called ditch is a natural or an artificial water course with the
statement that 'the ditch is obviously a man made, artificial
water course, * * *.' It is not so clear to me that the so called
ditch is either 'man made' or 'artificial.' It had, of course, its
origin in the action of man. The natural flow of water through
the same for a period of over forty years may have not only
changed its nature, size and appearance but changed its existence
from what was originally a mere ditch to a natural water course,
depending upon circumstances. Prior to the construction of the
ditch the waters now drained by it from the area of the streets
and alleys of the town flowed in almost the opposite direction
from that in which the waters now flow through the ditch ....
"I can not see that the mere definition of a natural water
course, as stated in the majority opinion, can be of much assistance, for the so called ditch, whether an artificial or a
natural water course, 'consists of a bed, banks and water, and
in which water usually flows in a certain direction and by a
regular channel with banks or sides.' The manner of the
creation of the water course does not control its classification.
It is not unusual for owners of land, acting alone or jointly,
to change the channel of a natural water course through their
lands. The change may straighten the course of a stream,
reclaim valuable land or better drain certain areas. In such circumstances I do not presume that it would be contended that
the new channel, though man made, would not be the natural
course for the flow of water. It would be an artificial change
in the water course, but a water course nevertheless." 53
In the dissenting opinion there is also recognition of the rights of
others to insist on the continuance of the artificial condition when
5
. 2 Id. at 145, 66 S.E.2d at 291.
13 Id. at 154, 66 S.E.2d at 295.
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a natural watercourse is changed, and the authority cited is based
on the estoppel theory and also on the analogy to rights by prescription. There is also recognition in the dissent that a drainage ditch
though of artificial origin may become a watercourse and that the
landowners adjoining it may have the same rights and duties as if
it had a natural origin.
It should be remembered that in the Neal case, cited in the majority
opinion for support, the court took the position that, even if it were
questionable whether a watercourse was involved, the defendant
"recognized and treated it as a water course, and cannot now be heard
to say that it is not a water course.""M This was apparently recognition of the applicability of the estoppel theory in determining water
rights.
In a more limited area, if artifical changes are made by a riparian
owner to benefit part of his land and he later conveys that part to
another, that person can insist upon the changed condition by virtue
of an implied grant of the easement.5 5 Likewise, if he retains the part
benefited, the grantee of the other part cannot insist upon restoration
of the original condition since the grantor retained his rights to the
changed condition by virtue of an implied reservation of the
easement.56

(g) Flood Waters.
Although there are a few cases contra, the great majority of the
decisions hold that flood waters of a stream, meaning the excess over
the ordinary quantity of water therein, are to be treated as part of
the stream and the riparian doctrine applies. At least this is true as
long as it is in fact part of the same body of water; that is, it is still
a part of the watercourse as long as it is confined by the highwater
banks which are at a greater distance from each other than the
ordinary banks.57 Furthermore, courts generally regard as part of
the stream even flood waters which have become temporarily
separated from the stream but which will return in time to the
ordinary channel.5" If the waters spread out over the adjoining land
54
-5

56

Neal v. Ohio River R.R., 47 W. Va. 316, 321, 34 S.E. 914, 915 (1899).
CALLAjN, op. cit. supra note 2 at § 31.

Ibid.

573 TiFFANY, RiEAL PoPEsRTY § 743 at 170 (3d ed. 1939). Compare
RESTATEzMENT, TORTS § 841 at 320, 324 (1939).
15 VI-A AmvcAN LAw OF PRoPERTY § 28.60 at 183 (Casner ed. 1954);

3 Txp,

Ty, REAL PROPERTY § 743 at

170 (3d ed. 1939).
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and become entirely severed from the stream with little likelihood
of return to the stream, they are regarded as surface water.59
This was the reasoning of the Ohio court in treating flood waters
as part of the stream:
"It is difficult to see upon what principle the flood waters of a
river can be likened to surface water. When it is said that a
river is out of its banks, no more is implied than that its volume
then exceeds what it ordinarily is. Whether high or low, the
entire volume at any one time constitutes the water of the
river at such time, and the land over which its current flows
must be regarded as its channel; so that when, swollen by rains
and melting snows, it extends and flows over the bottoms along
its course, that is its flood channel, as when, by droughts, it is
reduced to its minimum, that is its low water channel ...
""
There is no West Virginia case dealing with the beneficial use of
flood waters, but the West Virginia court has applied these principles
in dealing with the disposition of flood waters. In Uhl v. Ohio River
R.R.,6 ' the defendant interfered with the overflowing waters of the
Ohio River, at a point outside of its [ordinary] banks, by means of an
embankment. One of the defenses was that this water was surface
water. The plaintiff's property had been damaged by waters from
the river, during an ordinary flood, overflowing the embankment
when water on the river side rose faster than the water in a stream
on the plaintiff's property and by the embankment's retaining
the water on the plaintiff's property longer than it would have remained in the absence of the embankment. The court held that the
defendant was liable both for preventing the gradual rise of the water
over plaintiff's lot by the embankment, which caused the water level
to rise and the water to be cast as a waterfall on the lot, and for
preventing the normal outflow of the water from the basin. Since
this is the only West Virginia case in point, it is worth quoting
therefrom to this extent:
"Though the flow or current of a watercourse is one of its
pronounced characteristics, it is at variance with common
knowledge and reason to say that only such water of a stream
as is perceptibly moving may be considered a part if it. When
3 TnFFAY, IRAL PROPERTY § 743 at 170 (3d ed. 1939).
Crawford v. Rambo, 42 Ohio St. 279, 282, 7 N.E. 429, 431 (1886).
61 56 W. Va. 494, 49 S.E. 378 (1904).
6590
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one stream, uniting with another, obstructs its flow by reason of
its running bank full, while the other is low, and causes such
other stream to be filled with back water, can it be said that,
so long as the backwater stands, it is only surface water? Are
all the motionless pools within the banks of a river, produced by
the windings of its channel and current, to be called surface
water? Nobody has ever ventured such an unreasonable suggestion. If it be conceded, that the running waters of an overflowing river on the low lands outside of its banks do not cease
to be part of the river, as clearly they do not, what reason can
be assigned for a distinction outside of the banks which cannot
exist within them? The standing waters are supported and maintained by the great body of water forming the river. From
bank to bank, surface to bed, within the banks and beyond them,
as far as the water stands or flows, all the atoms or parts are,
for their positions, interdependent and inseparably united save
when absolutely severed. If, from the lowest point in the bed
a large quantity should be removed, a subsidence of the entire
surface would result, each particle finding a lower level by the
law of gravitation. That part of the water which flows is
simply seeking what the standing water has already found, its
level. By nature, it is all one body, until severed in some way,
and the law suggests no reason or principle upon which what
clearly is not severed can be deemed to have been cut off.
"No doubt such water often becomes so separated from the
river as to justify its classification as surface water. On the low
lands along our rivers, there are depressions having no outlets
to the river or elsewhere, and in which, when filled, the water
must stand until it passes away by evaporation through the air
and percolation through the soil. These are filled by overflow in
times of flood and, upon the recession of the river, are left full
of water. This overflow water is thereby effectually severed
from the waters of the river and, no doubt, becomes, under
the decisions, surface water. ...
"For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the overflow
water of a river, at times of ordinary flood, whether standing
motionless on the adjacent land, or sweeping over it, do not
cease to be part of the river, unless so separated from it as to
prevent its return ... .'
6

2 Id.

at 505, 49 S.E. at 383.
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The limitation in the opinion to "ordinary floods" has been noted,
but it must be remembered that the court found in this case that the
flood was only an ordinary flood and also that this limitation needed
to be applied as to liability for wrongfully disposing of water in a
stream. This need not be viewed as a limitation on beneficial use of
waters from extraordinary floods if the other standards as to the
water remaining a part of the stream are established.
Most of the cases in which the problem as to flood waters has
arisen have dealt with disposition of such waters rather than its
beneficial use. However, if they are parts of a stream, the riparian
doctrine would seem to apply to both disposition and use; and in
one case dealing with use of flood waters, the court applied the
riparian doctrine where the waters were found to be parts of the
stream."'
2. SURFAC E WATERS
As distinguished from streams or watercourses, the West Virginia
court has described surface water in the following manner:
"Surface water is water of casual, vagrant character, oozing
through the soil, or diffusing and squandering over and under the
surface, which, though usually and naturally flowing in known
direction, has no banks or channel cut in the soil; coming from
rain and snow, and occasional outbursts in time of freshet,
descending from mountains or hills, and inundating the country;
and the moisture of wet, spongy, springy, or boggy land. ...
In the more arid states, it is recognized that water, at a given
time and place, is pursuing a cycle, all stages of which are related
in that taking water from any source, whether above or below the
surface, affects the total supply. 65 In such states rights in surface
waters are generally the same whether the water is diffused or flows
in a watercourse. However, in most jurisdictions diffused surface
water has been placed in a separate classification and is governed
by special legal rules applied to what is generally called "surface

waters."
63 Thompson v. New Haven Water Co., 86 Conn. 597, 86 AUt. 585 (1913)
(upper riparian owner not permitted to divert flood water to a reservoir for

the purpose of sale).
64 Neal v. Ohio River R.R., 47 W. Va. 316, 34 S.E. 914 (1899)

(point
2 of syllabus). Compare the definition of surface waters in RESTATFhmNT,
ToRTs
6 5 § 846 (1939).
VI-A AmEcAN LAw oF PopERTy § 28.61 at 186 (Casner ed. 1939);
CALLAHAN, PRwciPL Es oF WATm BIGHrs LAw n OHmo § 36 (1957).
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It may at times be difficult to determine whether the water is
diffused or in a stream but, if it is diffused, the law in relation thereto
has been expressed by the West Virginia court as follows:
". ... each owner may fight surface water as he chooses.
He may use it all, divert it away from the lower land, may
prevent its invasion of his own land, and thus dam it up on
his neighbor's land. He may, in the use of his land, cause it to
flow differently upon his neighbor's from what it did before.
Gould, Waters, § 263, very clearly states the basic principle
thus: 'Water spread over the surface of land, or gathering
in natural depressions, or into swamps or bayous, or percolating
the soil beneath the surface, if flowing in no definite channel,
does not constitute a water course, and is not subject to the law
regulating riparian owners. By the common-law no rights can
be claimed jure naturae in the flow of surface water, and its

detention, expulsion, or diversion is not an actionable injury,
even when injury results to others....
"But this rule seems harsh, applied without limitation, and,
even where the common-law rule was the basis or standard of
decision, an exception was recognized. While recognizing the
right of the owner of the higher field or lot to throw his surface
water upon the lower, even if, in the use of his land, it changed
or increased the flow upon the lower field or lot, yet it must not
be collected in a body, and in such body or mass cast upon that
lower field or lot."66
The holding in every West Virginia case on surface waters has
been related to attempts to dispose of such water rather than to use
it, but it has often been recognized, as in the above quotation, that
the owner of the land may freely take and use all of the surface
water which comes upon his land to the exclusion of any possible
lower landowners.6" This is apparently true whether he uses it
66

Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 315, 318, 26 S.E. 266, 267,

268 (1896).
67 See, for example, Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 56 W. Va. 494, 497, 49 S.E.
378, 379 (1904).
2 THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 649 (perm. ed. rev. 1939) recognizes
that the owner of the land may use or divert the whole of such water, stating
that he has an unqualified right to appropriate all of the surface water to
his own use, but does recognize that in a few jurisdictions the landowner's
right to obstruct or divert such water is limited to what is necessary in the
reasonable use of his own land. As to the test in the latter jurisdictions,
compare the position of the West Virginia court as to percolating waters
discussed in the text, infra. To the effect that restrictions which may be
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for domestic or commercial purposes and whether the "lower"
landowner would desire to use it for domestic or commercial purposes." However, it might be questioned whether one person might
maliciously deprive another of the use of surface water."
3. PERCOLATING WATERS

Underground diffused waters are often designated by the courts
as "percolating." They are distinguished from underground bodies

or streams of water which exist in known and well-defined channels. Percolating waters are those which ooze or percolate through
the earth. The West Virginia court has taken the position that
underground waters are presumed to be percolating waters until
it is shown that they exist in known and well-defined channels,
and further, that the law will recognize as underground streams
only those which are known to so exist or that they do so exist
can be ascertained or discovered from surface indications or other
means without subsurface excavations for that purpose.7
Even though the withdrawal of percolating waters by one property
owner may diminish the supply of such waters available to another,
and even though such withdrawal may affect the water flowing in
streams on the surface, the law as to percolating waters is quite
recognized in any particular state in regard to percolating waters may
be applied to surface waters, see 3 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 744 (3d
1939). Compare VI-A Ammuc:AN LAw OF PRoPERTY § 28.62 (Casner
1954). See generally 2 TnoispsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 660 (penn. ed.
68 See the authorities cited in the second pragraph of note 67, supra.

also

ed.
ed.

rev.

69

In addition to the authorities cited in the second paragraph of note 67,
supra, see RESTATEUMNT, TORTS § 864 (1939) to the effect that a possessor
of surface waters on his land consuming them by using them there is ordinarily
reasonable and does not subject him to liability to another by interfering with
the latter's use unless the use is made for the primary purpose of harming
the other. Compare the position of the West Virginia court as to percolating
waters,
7 0 as set forth in the text, infra.
Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296, 300, 52 S.E. 702, 704 (1905). To
the same effect, see VI-A A NmwcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.65 (Caser ed.
1954); 1 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 75 (penn. ed. rev. 1939); 3 TiFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 748 (3d ed. 1939). The last cited authority takes the
position that water is known to be flowing in a well-defined watercouse only
when the existence and course of the channel can be ascertained by the
reasonable inference of an ordinary man without the necessity of making
excavations. American Law of Property makes reference to the use of dye tests,
surface indications, sounds of subsurface flow and casually connected reductions in surface stream levels to rebut the presumption that underground
waters are not flowing in an underground channel. It is also mentioned in
this treatise that in Colorado the presumption is the other way. Many cases
involving subterranean and percolating waters are collected in Annot., 55
A.L.R. 1385 (1929) and Annot., 109 A.L.R. 395 (1937). See generally 2
THoMPsoN, REAr PROPERTY § 663 (penn. ed. rev. 1939).
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different from that applied to surface streams. The early common
law rule was that percolating waters might be taken by the owner
of the land in which it is found without regard to the effect of such
taking on the percolating waters available to others."1 This rule
is followed in many states today. The West Virginia court, however, rejected this rule and limits the use by the owner of the land
to a reasonable and beneficial use, where to use it otherwise would
deprive the owners of adjacent and neighboring lands of the enjoyment of the waters of their lands.7 2 The court recognizes that
the beneficial use of the water on the land may be for some purpose
in connection with the ordinary operations of agriculture, mining,
domestic purposes, or improvements.73 It has indicated that the
use may be for any purpose for which an owner may legitimately use
and enjoy his land. 4 However, under the West Virginia rule this
would not include the extracting of the water for use elsewhere by
strangers who have no right thereto as against the owners of the
neighboring lands.7 5
VI-A A mmeAN LAw OF PRoPF_.TY § 28.66 (Casner ed. 1954); 1
R.AL PROPERTY § 75 (perm. ed. rev. 1939); 3 TiWFAY, REAL
PROPERTY § 746 (3d ed. 1939). These authorities recognize that the principle
stated in the text is not applicable if the owner of the land takes the water
solely to interfere maliciously with another's water supply. See particularly
3 Tn'iANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 747 (3d ed. 1939). Compare the 'reasonable
use" 72
doctrine concerning percolating waters, discussed in the text, infra.
Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296 302 52 S.E. 702, 704 (1905). In
reaching this conclusion, the court made te following observation:
"We must yield assent to the later doctrine of reasonable and beneficial
use, which constitutes rather a qualification of the early rule than an announcement of a new rule. The later doctrine seems to us to be sustained by the
weight of authority as well as by the weight of reason. What is a reasonable
and beneficial use under this later doctrine must be determined in the light
of the facts and circumstances appearing in each case as it arises ....
Such
reasonable and beneficial use has often been understood and held to mean,
use for any purpose for which the owner of the land, upon which underground,
such percolating waters are found, might legitimately use and enjoy his land.
." Id. at 305, 52 S.E. at 706.
73
1Id. at 302, 52 S.E. at 705 (quoting from Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law).
For recognition of other "reasonable" uses, see Drummond v. Whiteoak Fuel
Co., 104 W. Va. 368, 376, 140 S.E. 57, 60 (1927) (quoting from a New
Jersey7 4 decision).
Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296, 305, 52 S.E. 702, 706 (1905). In
Drummond v. Whiteoak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va. 368, 375, 140 S.E. 57, 60
(1927), the court stated that the Pence case did not seriously attempt to
define the rule of "reasonable use" but that the case recognized that it had
been held "to apply to any purpose for which a landowner might legitimately
use and enjoy his land'."
75 Cross, Groundwaters in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 149, 151
PRtOPERTY § 746 at 176 (3d ed. 1939) recognizes
3 TrrAy,
(152).
the principle
of law, Rzm.
but criticizes
it where the water, such as mineral water,
has little value for purposes other than sale. The West Virginia court seems
71

THOmPSON,
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The West Virginia rule is often called the "reasonable use" doctrine, 6 but this should not be confused with that doctrine as applied to the taking of water from streams. That is a correlative
rights approach, whereas here the test is the reasonableness of the
use of the water on the land from which it is taken.
In those jurisdictions which continue to follow the early common
law doctrine of absolute ownership in percolating waters, some
modifications have occasionally been applied. A malicious taking
of the water for the purpose of injuring another has been held actionable by the majority of the courts."7 This result should clearly
follow in a "reasonable use" jurisdiction such as West Virginia.
Our court quotes the following with approval:
"'... it is accordingly held that if such water is drawn off,
not in the bona fide enjoyment of the defendant's property, but
for no beneficial purpose, and a fortiori if it be drawn off
maliciously, he may be enjoined from so doing, especially if
the interests of the public would otherwise suffer, though the
water be used colorably for some purpose of benefit to
himself.' . . .

This would also seem to cover the situation which has concerned
other courts, namely, whether the one withdrawing the water will
be liable if he is actuated by a desire to injure his neighbor. The
rule stated above would test the action of the one withdrawing the
water by the reasonableness of the action.
If the one taking percolating waters from the land deprives another of such waters through negligence, the one injured is more
likely to have a remedy in a "reasonable use" jurisdiction than in
a common law absolute ownership jurisdiction. 9 There is no case
in point in West Virginia, but the court indicates that the landowner has no right to waste such water, whether through malice
to have recognized this principle of law. Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296,
303, 52 S.E. 702, 705 (1905). This limitation seems inherent in the concept
of a reasonable and beneficial use of the waters on the land in which it is

found.
76

VI-A AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.66 (Casner ed. 1954); 1
THomsoN, REAL PnoPERTY § 75 (penn. ed. rev. 1939); 3 Tn-YrNY, REAL
PnOPEnTy § 746 (3d ed. 1939). This was recognized by the West Virginia
court in Drummond v. Whiteoak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va. 368, 375, 140 S.E. 57,
60, (1927).
77 See the authorities cited in note 71 supra.
78 Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296, 304, 52 S.E. 702, 705 (1905).
79 CALLAUN, op. cit. supra note 65, at § 53.
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or indifference."0 However, the court held that temporary wasting
on the facts shown in connection with the completion of a well for
use in running a hotel on the land was not an unreasonable use.81
Also our court has indicated that no liability arises when the diversion is made for a reasonable use "by operations conducted in the
usual way." 2
Extraction of minerals is a reasonable use of property, and the
diversion of percolating waters in mining operations creates no
liability for others' losses of such waters therefrom.8 3 However,
if the mining operation does not leave adequate subjacent support
of the surface in its natural state and the surface breaks or subsides,
and as a result damages springs or wells, liability for the loss
attaches.8 4 There is no West Virginia case dealing with loss of
lateral or subjacent support of land by the mere withdrawal of percolating waters, and the courts and textwriters are not agreed as
to whether such withdrawal may create liability or on the facts which
will create such liability if it does arise from such act.8"
The rights of landowners as to percolating waters may come in
conflict with the rights of riparian owners if the percolating waters
are so located that withdrawal thereof may affect the level of the
stream. The cases are not in agreement. Some hold that the
landowner may appropriate percolating waters without liability to
riparian owners even though the withdrawal indirectly lowers the
level of the stream. Some have held that the riparian's rights prevail
over the rights of others in percolating waters. 6
80 Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296, 304, 52 S.E. 702, 705 (1905).
The
court was quoting with approval and the statement in the text above is limited

by these words: "if by such waste the neighboring landowner is deprived of

percolating waters which otherwise would be within his land and which
he there has a necessity for using." The added statement seems to merely

indicate the person who may complain concerning such waters being wasted
by the other landowner. Compare 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 746 at 177

(3d ed. 1939).
81 The court found that the evidence of the plaintiffs in a great measure
sustained the contention of the defendants that the pumping was only temporary, was without malice, and was for the purpose of completing the well
for use.
82 Drummond

v. Whiteoak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va. 368, 376, 140 S.E. 57,

60 (1927).
83
84

Ibid. Compare 3 TIFANY,REAL PRoPERTY § 746 at 177 (3d ed. 1939).
Drummond v. Whiteoak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va. 368, 377, 140 S.E. 57,

60 (1927).
8

1VI-A AMEIucAN LAW OF PRoPmETY § 28.46 (Casner ed. 1954).

86 CALLAEAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at § 56.
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4.

UNDERGROUND WATER IN WATERCOURSES

Waters which flow underground and meet the standards established for watercourses or streams on the surface are often called
subterranean streams. These standards and examples of their application have already been set forth herein under the first classification. Under the discussion of the third classification, the difficulty of proof as to the existence of subterranean streams has been
mentioned."' However, if the existence of an underground stream
can be proved, the body of law which applies to the use of such
waters is the same as that which applies to the use of surface
streams.88 Repetition of that law and the difficulties inherent in
its application seems unnecessary. This has already been treated
under the first classification.
CONCLUSION

Although this discussion as to West Virginia law has been
based of necessity largely on predictions of what the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will hold concerning such water
rights, it is believed that such predictions are reasonably accurate.
They represent the common law in other jurisdictions, and the Constitution of West Virginia provides that the common law shall be
the law of this state except to the extent it is changed by the Constitution or by legislation.89
As we have seen, some phases of the common law doctrine of
riparian rights discourage the development of new projects or expansion of existing projects which would make beneficial use of the
water resources of the state. Perhaps some phases of the doctrine
of prior appropriation should be coordinated with the common
law doctrines as to water rights, even though doing so would involve the establishment of administrative machinery to determine
certain water rights.9 Some states have already made such changes
in their law by legislation. Some of these statutes have been held
invalid under the provisions of state constitutions. Similar changes
in our law by legislation might be held invalid under our present
87 See note 70 supra and the text thereto.
88
VI-A AamCAN LAw oF PtopERTr § 28.65 (Casner ed. 1954); 1

THompsoN, REAL PRoPEanTY § 75 at 87 (perm. ed. rev. 1939); 3 TiFFANY,
REAL PnoPERTY § 748 (3d ed. 1939).
89 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 21.
90
Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use
of Water, 33 TExAs L. REV. 24, 25 (1954).
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Constitution.91 Thus, amendment of the State Constitution may be
needed.
However, prior to considering legislative changes in our existing
law or questioning the constitutionality of such proposed changes,
other questions need to be answered. Before these questions are
answered, we may need more factual information. Do we now
know what are the water needs for our future economy? Assuming
we need increased industrialization, which types shall be given
preference if conflicts in water needs develop? Will the answer
be affected by the size of the industry? Will the type and location
of the water involved be material? If these factors are to be considered before determinations are made, who will consider them
and according to what standards? When these decisions are reached,
shall they be final ones or shall they be tentative depending upon
possible future changes in our economy? Answers to these questions and other related ones are needed before it should be decided
to what extent the present law is unsatisfactory and what changes
ought to be made therein in order to obtain the most efficient
beneficial use of the water resources of the state.

91 Scurlock, Constitutionality of Water Rights Regulation, 1 KAN. L. EEV.
PROPERT § 28.56

125-150, 298-318 (1952); see also VI-A AMERIcAN LAWv OF
n. 15 (Casner ed. 1954).
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